On one of my CPL nav, I brought along a passenger because he had not flown across the Wellington Strait before towards the south island. That day, the weather down south was predicted to turn bad in the evening and since my flight was in the afternoon, I decided to proceed with the flight. Nothing went wrong as we were flying south until we needed to cross the strait. The cloud base was low and it was not advisable to fly too low when crossing a body of water. But because I had a passenger and he was eager to see the south island, I continued. We did a touch n go at WB and was heading back towards the north. When we came to the strait, the cloud base got even lower than before. In my bad judgment, I decided to cross it at a low altitude. Thankfully nothing bad happened.
After we landed, I briefed my passenger that it was actually not a good idea to fly so low when crossing the strait. This is because, in an emergency (engine failure), we will not have the luxury of time and space to decided where we want to go and checks to do. It was a good learning experience and made me a bit wiser in my future decision making.
Wonder if this is a good example of airmanship. Given that you lectured your passenger (hope another ab-initio pilot!), but you already recognized your decisions were not good at least in two instances, when you decided against your best knowledge:
*(a) to please your passenger ("The cloud base was low and it was not advisable to fly too low when crossing a body of water. But because I had a passenger and he was eager to see the south island, I continued").
*(b) in your return leg ("When we came to the strait, the cloud base got even lower than before. In my bad judgment, I decided to cross it at a low altitude. […] After we landed, I briefed my passenger that it was actually not a good idea to fly so low when crossing the strait. This is because, in an emergency (engine failure), we will not have the luxury of time and space to decided where we want to go and checks to do").
Better be moved to incidents!
[In behalf of Anonymous user, originally posted on 22 Oct 2008]
During my pre-ppl training, I went for a solo flight out of Palmerston North. Everything went fine as always, until i came back to join PM control. After calling up for clearance, I received no reply, and had to break off my entry and hold outside. After troubleshooting the comms for ten minutes, shutting them down, checking frequencies, adjusting everything available, I managed to get a scratchy reply that was readable about 2-3, and communicated my comms problem and was asked to hold while they moved some traffic out of the way. Finally managed to get clearance in, and landed without any issues, besides having to ask every transmission to be repeated about three times (made for a hairy landing clearance). After parking the aircraft and going inside, I informed the Ops controller, who asked me not to fault the aircraft as a senior instructor wanted to use the aircraft after me and would sort the problem. I then tried to talk to another instructor about the problem and how I handled it, but since nothing went horribly wrong and no one complained, I was shrugged off. After the senior Instructor started up and tried to contact ATC, he came back inside in a foul mood complaining about how I hadn't entered anything on the tech log! This was a really nerve wracking experience for a training pilot, and I feel it would have helped a lot to have someone talk about it seriously with me, and confirm that all my actions were correct and I hadn't made some silly mistake. (talking to my personal instructor later, they went through it all with me, and then went and spoke to the instructor who shrugged me off, who later apologised…)
This has taught me a valuable lesson: Just because someone doesn’t have as much experience as you, or is just learning, doesn’t mean they can’t spot a fault or tell you when something is wrong. Also, if you want help, or someone to talk to about an incident, keep asking till someone listens. It’s definitely reassuring to know you did the right thing.
[In behalf of charliemikehotel, originally posted on 22 Oct 2008]
Good on you for pursuing that. I've had a couple of times as well where I've felt I should green card a fault or a problem, and been told by the DI/Ops Controller not to do it because someone needs to use the aircraft (usually an instructor). In fact i had one time where I took the initiative and green-carded a fault, then got told off for not running it by the DI/Ops! Like you said, a fault is a fault whether it's me who spots it (with 160-odd hrs) or the CFI. It sometimes seems like convenience takes priority over safety…
[In behalf of SBK981A, originally posted on 22 Oct 2008]
I was returning from a scenic flight around Auckland City and was returning to Ardmore Aerodrome from overhead Papakura after flying over Auckland Intl. Airport. I made a call once I was clear of the Auckland Control Zone that I was overhead a reporting point and that I was intending to join from an extended downwind position. I made another about 2 miles later overhead a very prominent reporting point (Papakura Township) that I was joining downwind for runway 21. However just prior to this call I heard an aircraft (a Beechcraft Duchess twin) call rolling on runway 21 vacating to the south IFR. At this I though ok, he will pass behind me and probably higher than me as I had some knowledge of the IFR departure routes at Ardmore. However as I called again abeam the threshold of runway 03 that I was established downwind, needless to say as soon as I let go of the mic, I saw the Duchess approaching from my left and that he was about to climb through my level. I instantly recognised an extreme mid-air collision risk and immediatly turned left (*towards the Duchess*), in a 80 degree angle of back descending turn. The collision was averted, even though I was close enough to almost see the guys nostrils! The other pilot hadn't seen me until I turned.
This incident highlights a number of safety factors:
1) The importance of making clear and regular radio calls, but more importantly listening to other traffic as well.
2) Full situational awareness (eyes outside) when flying at uncontrolled aerodromes, even if you are IFR.
3) The ability to make snap decision making.
4) Being on top of your game physically and mentally (IMSAFE) when flying, as if I had been tired I may have reacted differently.
5) Disregard passenger comfort in the event of an emergency. (I knew I had passengers that didnt like rapid or sudden changes in flight and were prone to air sickness, but I didnt let this stop me from making an evasive maneouvre.
** I decided to turn left towards the aircraft as I weighed up possibilities in a few split seconds and if I turned right then the aircraft would have been behind me and as a twin would have had to take its own evasive action. Also I would most likely have turned infront of it. So a descending turn to the left was the best option…
SBK981A =)
On my flight test for CPL cross country, i went to Omaka aerodrome. i was giving a clearance for Ponds arrival. the procedures says that i had to "Enter CTR via T655 (ponds) at 1000ft or below. Thence track east of Wairau bar and vernon works and via watertank to omaka 1500 ft or below after passing vernon works". so i did all this procedure, however i wasn't sure where vernon works are, so i manage to ask the ATC to give me some information about it. at the end i found out where it was, then after that i track to watertank to omaka at 1500 feet, and then the ATC told me to to hold to the "new renwick road" due to the traffic outbound for runway 24 at woodbourne, but apparently that was my first time going to omaka, so i did not know where it was. So i make an initiative to call the ATC that im was not familiar with the area, and request to track to the east of omaka airfield. and it works, the tower was happy about it and it helps him as well, because the traffic were also very busy. On the way back at PM my instructor told me that i had make a good airmanship talking very actively to ATC.
Anonymous (202.150.110.x), 02 Nov 2008 17:58
On my preparation flight to get my PPL license i flew with my instructor. He was a B cat instructor, when we took off from runway 07, we roll out at normal speed and rotate at 55 knots, i checked all my instrument which are RPM gauge is positive rising, ASI increase, engine instrument the T's and P's are all in the green range, however when we get to 55knot im about to pull the control column, i again check my engine instrument, and i found out that the oil pressure are now on the yellow range and decrease indicate to red, ie, we encounter a low oil pressure, therefore i decide to abort the take off, and my instructor was agree with my decision. and he said that it was a good airmanship, to often check the engine instrument especially on initial climb for take off. In other words it is good airmanship to cross check everything not only once, but twice is better during the initial climb.
Anonymous (125.238.124.x), 03 Nov 2008 03:17
ON short finals for the grass runway at palmerston north, an aircraft had just landed on the seal and taxied off, ATC had told the aircraft to hold short of the grass but the aircraft past through the holding then stopping a few metres past on the grass runway approach path. My instructor and I decided to go round as the aircraft was not in the holding point. even though there was pently of room to land with the wind shear conditions common at PM i think it was good airmanship to take the extra time to go around and not take the extra risk.
It was a navigational flight that both me and my friend have been waiting for after about 13 cancellations due to weather. we were both psyched up and excited that the weather was good that we decided to go. he was the first to take off and i followed closely behind. we were on our VN5 and were flying from palmerston north to danniverke to napier and back. over the gorge it looked really clear and the TAF stated that there were just FEW clouds at low levels. but when i flew over the clouds seemed to have thicken and it was hard to navigate from ground to map as we could barely see the ground. i decided to turn back as i didnt know where danniverke would be so i radiocalled and said i was turning back. just minutes later my friend told me to push on but i said no. in the end we both cancelled our flight and when i asked him why he didnt continue since he said it was fine - his reason was because he actually couldnt find danniverke too until he had to decent below the clouds on ly to find out the ground level was pretty close.
Hi , i would think that it was a good piece of airmanship on your part, however, your friend did take an unnecessary risk by decending below the cloud level. air currents and terrain may be extremely hazardous and it could have cost him more than just his flight. Think that your decision was the right one and stubborness just to push the flight is not a right decision.
Bad-weather flying or scud-running in conditions below VFR minima is as bad and as risky as it can get. Bad weather and restricted visibility is an unsafe condition. To attempt passage in these circumstances is an unsafe act. Good airmanship examples can be shared among us as pilots; can also extend the knowledge and understanding and hopefully assist us in making better weather-related decisions.
Occurred in April 2000, the pilot of a Cessna set off on a late-morning flight from Central Otago to the lower North Island. The proposed time of his departure had been delayed by about three hours because of poor weather conditions en route. Although local weather conditions had improved with time, the weather over a section of the pilot’s planned outbound route remained in question. The Cessna configured for bad weather, after 20 minutes of flying, the aircraft was eventually impeded by a situation of valley cloud. The pilot initiated a reversal turn and made a decision not to pursue the original flight plan, returned to the home base.
The pressure to get to a destination can be great, sometimes the pressures exerted by passengers. It is essential that these pressures are resisted and the decision on whether or not to continue is based solely on safety.
It was a couple of months back, I was on a dual flight for PPL checks with an instructor at the northern training area. After completing our air exercises, I was instructed to dump the hood on to finish up my basic instrument hours. I was instructed to demonstrate a standard overhead rejoin for runway 28. At 1500 feet indicated I was told to set up for descent to circuit level of 1200 ft and given and 'all clear' lookout.
Just when i was about to reduce power, I was instructed to hold on my descent just a little longer. 'Blind' and confused I asked my instructor his rationale for giving those instructions. He said there was an aircraft that was on upwind that we should give way to which I found rather peculiar because I could have easily and smoothly joined early downwind with plenty of separation between me and that said aircraft. I was told that it that the PIC in that aircraft was on his first solo and it would be safer and probably less stressful for him if he did not have any traffic ahead of him. So i delayed my non traffic side descent (by an alarmingly great amount of time) and join early downwind, with the first solo pilot turning onto base as number 1 for a full stop.
No doubt in this case of good airmanship (as directed by my instructor of course), many argue that deliberately 'easing' a fellow pilot's first solo experience might deprive him of experiencing situations that he would have to eventually face later on during his training. Every student pilot or even commercial pilot would definitely recall his/her first solo experience and the stress, tension and nerves involved in flying alone for the first time. Hence I personally feel that it is good practice to give way to first soloist so that they can have focus more attention on 'aviating' and to seal their first solo as a very memorable experience.
There have been many accidents involving ab-initio pilots on their first solo. The most recent one I can recall would be the mid-air collision in late August this year at Moorabbin Airport in Australia (its relatively near Melbourne, Victoria). I was actually in Melbourne when the incident happened and had mates that we also student pilots who were training at Moorabbin Airport. Some of them even witnessed the mid-air collision of the 2 training aircraft. The accident took the live of one Indian pilot who was flying his first solo at Moorabbin. More information can be found here [Moorabbin Fatal Crash]
This incident occured about 5 months ago on a cross country flight from Woodbourne back to Feilding. In my flight school, we have been taught to utilise the transit lane T354 (just to the west of Palmerston Control Zone) when tracking south and north (when on our way back to the aerodrome). This transit lane has height restrictions (from surface to 1000 feet AMSL) and if you get a chance to spot it on a Visual Navigation Chart, you will notice that it is not very wide (approximately 3-4 nautical miles wide). T354 is a narrow corridor with very shallow height restrictions, for GA aircraft to track north/south of the area without bothering Palmerston Tower.
During this incident, I was tracking North from Paraparaumu back to Feilding via T354 at 1000 feet. When I was at the southern boundary of the transit lane, another aircraft made a call on the frequency stating that he was southbound on T354. In such a situation, it was essential for both aircraft to maintain vertical and horizontal separation and to establish quick visual contact. The southbound aircraft made a call stating that he was going to remain close to the western boundary (close to a small town named Rongotea) of the transit lane at 800 feet. Likewise, I made a call indicating that I would be tracking the eastern boundary (which technically would be along the manawatu river) at 1000 feet. Both pilots kept a vigilant lookout for each other and we managed establish visual contact as early as we could.
This example points out the grave importance of being extra disciplined and vigilant when flying VFR through small 'corridors' like that of T354 where aircraft separation is a lot less than what us pilots prefer. A 3-mile horizontal and 200-foot vertical separation is not exactly the most ideal of situations but with good lookout, practice and airmanship navigating through challenging airspace can actually be rather enjoyable when done safely.
