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Hi from ATC…
So I've added some comments to the Ab-initio threads, and I'm here to answer any questions you might have about ATC. I also have a PPL, so I know what it's like to be on the other end of the mic. Come on, bombard me with questions (and not only to get marks for university papers!)
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Some reasons not to be embarrassed when asking for help or clarification from ATC:
1 You won't be the first person doing it, and you won't be the last
2 We'd really rather you asked than didn't, and then messed up the nice sequence we'd made!
3 Perhaps we got muddled with our clearance (ATC's have to train too)
4 We have radar and checklists for all sorts (from engine failure to lost above cloud)
5 You won't be the first, and you won't be the last!
Cheers!
Thanks for taking the time to stop by and make suggestions/comments! Its great to have someone from the other side of the mic explain things and certainly comment on some myths to do with ATC :)
it was one of my night flying and this happened when me and my friend were both on solo flights were doing our night "navigation". as we took off and were both heading in the same direction as we both planned the same route. i was first and was heading to fielding. as i was overhead fielding and was on the way to foxton, i had to make a radiocall to ask if i could pass through it. but my friend was the first to call ohakea. i was ahead of him and i knew that he was directly above fielding. but ohakea told him that he was really close to their airspace and had to turn.
knowing that the instruction was for me and not for him, and having him in my sight, i turned and kept him in my side. we both gave radiocalls and knew we had each other in sight. this flight would have been a reporting incident if i carried on with what i had done but it was a major confusion if we both was not aware of each other as ohakea confused the position of the both of us.
Wanna give a clap to the controller(s) at Hamilton, really impressed with them because they have been very professional, I recently came up to Hamilton to do some flying and traffic at Hamilton is pretty intense from what I was used to when I was flying with Massey. At one point there were three aircraft on the runway, with 1 or two others on final approach to land and the controllers still managed to keep everything under control and everyone took off and landed without incident or delay.
I believe this was the result of exceptional situational awareness (or stress increasing performance!) . anyway kudos to the people 'a few levels above us'.
An interesting note is that Hamilton International Airport has, at times, has exceeded auckland as NZ's busiest airport when comparing takeoffs and landings within a given period of time. During busy periods there could be 5-6 aircraft in the circuit, 4-5 lining up for takeoff and two others in the instrument approach.
I would like to ask your thoughts on Space Air Traffic Control. It seems we were behind the power curve when air traffic contgrol finally got started in the US in the 1930s . Are we going to make the same mistake with some sort of control in space?
As recently as two weeks ago I was informed by a highly reliable source about an act that I can only describe as stupid and highly unethical. It refers to an incident that occurred in the realms of air traffic control (ATC). I have about four years experience with various aspects of ATC and can say that the following account is not representative of the industry's safety culture and I hope that it is an isolated event.
A highly experienced controller was recently deemed to be operating at a less than acceptable standard, in fact I believe that he had caused several incidents in recent times. The training section was instructed by standards to take this controller on immediate remedial training in the simulator to enable the controller to see the areas in which he had fallen short and then to identify better practices to prevent these failures occurring again. The training was set for three weeks during which he was to experience several different exercises which would enable him to learn from previous mistakes. Not only was the training an opportunity for the controller to improve, but it was also an opportunity for the ATC organisation to terminate his employment should he not achieve the basic standards for a safe controller. Granted, this would have been the last resort as with all collective employment contracts in this age, the employer must demonstrate that they are in fact a good employer and be seen to be providing all the assistance to the employee.
The controller undertook the required training over the three week period as instructed. According to my source, the controller failed to attain a sufficient standard throughout the training and caused 'raised eyebrows' when supervisors realised that perhaps he was not going to attain an acceptable standard within the allocated three week time frame. The controller was permitted to sit the final practical examination in which he was required to pass if he wanted to get back on the roster. The controller was not deemed to be consistently of standard and I question whether he should have been permitted to take the examination at this point, however permission was granted. I think that further training should have been offered.
The controller must also have doubted his own ability as he then asked the trainer / examiner if he could see and practice the exam before the real exam. This should have rung alarm bells as an unethical request. What amazes me even more is that the trainer / examiner allowed him to do so (they are personal friends). As you could probably imagine, the controller made various mistakes in the practice run but when it came time to sit the examination for real he passed (I guess that practice makes perfect). The controller and trainer were emailed praise from the sector supervisor on a job well done (got to love that).
This worries me (and it should worry you as well) because there are various serious shortfalls outlined here, all of which greatly affect aviation safety.
The first relates to the reason that standards instructed the controller to undertake remedial training in the first place. It was because he was not up to a consistently safe standard. Remember we are talking about keeping aircraft apart from eachother in the skies above us. If he is not deemed safe, then potentially hundreds of people can die as a result of a mid air collision. So if the controller was not deemed safe, why then did the organisation allow this controller to be trained and examined by a personal friend? I can forgive the organisation for allowing the friend to do the training, but certainly not the examination. Given that this controller is now deemed by the organisation as being competent, he is now back in the roster with minimal supervision. The next incident he causes could easily be fatal for someone else.
The second point relates to the Employment Contracts Act 1991. Has it got to the point where employers are too scared of personal grievances to sack a poor performer? Is it too difficult to sack such a performer? If so then aviation is in for some really scary times ahead. When I go flying either privately or with an airline as a passenger, I want to know that the professionals who are tasked with my life are actually capable of guarding it. In this case I can say that this controller is not. He is sub-par and this is unacceptable.
I suppose that when this controller has another incident (and he will) the organisation will be covered as all the right things were seemingly done in terms of this training. I am sure that neither the controller nor his trainer / examiner will ever admit to what they did. Therefore in the absence of a whistle blower, they will get away with it.
So how do we prevent this from occurring in the first place? It would be a great thing to look at the selection policies for the organisation. In this case however, it would not have played a part in the decline of the controllers standards as he had been rated on position for a good number of years. There are other latent errors however that can be rectified. Policy must change in terms of who the trainer / examiners are. Especially in terms of any established personal relationships between the trainee and trainer. This was an obvious conflict of interest. This should have been obvious to the organisation and should never have been allowed to occur. It should be a matter of policy that the trainer never becomes the examiner as well. When I sat my CPL I was trained by a great instructor, but was examined by an independent flight examiner. This ruled out any bias and meant that I was going to have to meet the required standard in order to pass and gain the CPL…. I did!
To finish, I wonder how common this kind of occurrence is in the aviation sector? Is it ever acceptable?
Hi there:
I have read your post about you are concerning about this kind of practice (practice a final exam before sitting it).
I fully understand where you are coming from, however, here is my point of view, even though I have no qualification with ATC.
When doing an exam, or flight test, everyone gets nervous, and some people just dont perform well under those kind of circumstances. This is when line trainning come in. The instructors are required to deliver the sylibus and pass on the knowledge, at the same time, assess the ability of the trainee. There is a fine line between being practical and cheating. And in this case, from my understanding, the trainee has the ability to complete the tasks and fully understood the ATC procedures and practices.
At the same time, passing an exam or flight test, let's say 70%, which means we are competent of what we are doing, no matter CPL nav or ATC stuff. However, there are 30% we got wrong. How would the public preceive about this? As a pilot, if you dont know 30% of your knowledge, and an accident happen and that ended up from that 30% you got wrong, do you consider yourself competent? If you want to be saving lives behind your seat, you should know absolutly everything.
Meeting standards, i.e CPL flight test, does not mean you will survive a forced landing without power. Being competent of what you are doing and experience on the job will help you in the real world.
From a company's point of view, Airways have spent money and resources to train up this controller, and it would be time wasted if Airways just dump him/her in a heart beat. Thats the difference between a flying school and a job training. As controllers, the company wants you to pass, there is abolutly no benefit to fail a student, at the same time, I will garrenttee you that no safety is compromised. Airways will have its own procedures to handle students with below average performances, extra training and under strict supervision will be given.
Please do not take this the wrong way, this is just my point of view, and I am sure safety standards were not ignored, unless you have evidence, then report the behaviour with your support to Airways and CAA, because no one would want to put safety at risk with actual sub standard controllers.
"""At the same time, passing an exam or flight test, let's say 70%, which means we are competent of what we are doing, no matter CPL nav or ATC stuff. However, there are 30% we got wrong. How would the public preceive about this? As a pilot, if you dont know 30% of your knowledge, and an accident happen and that ended up from that 30% you got wrong, do you consider yourself competent? If you want to be saving lives behind your seat, you should know absolutly everything""""
Regarding the comment above by Yu Song. It is correct that we need to get 70% to pass the exam. About 30% that we got wrong or whatever percentage we get wrong student pilot will be issued with KDR ( Knowledge Deficiency Report). After that we will go away and find a answer and go to A or B cat instructor where we will tell them the answer we got wrong and they will sign it off, meaing now we know the anwer for what we got wrong. It is must we do KDR before the flight test. lets say for example student got 95% on his test and only one question he got wrong was describe correct landing procedure/ technique. So it make sense we know all the answer that was in exam prior to flight test. About your question "How would the public preceive about this?" Well to the public ,as a student pilot prespective we need to get 70% to pass and need to know all the answers of question that was in exam. I hope it helps. Pilots are trained for all the normal and abnormal situation that you could think of and could happen in real life.
According to […] being competent " is to have or show knowledge, skills abilities, the heuristic know- how situation and other attributes appropriate to the situation". Being competent is not getting 100% in a exam. How would people feel if they must have to get 100% in the exam? I don't think any one would agree with it. Even exam can't examine all the question from the books that we study. It is up to us to reivse and stay current with the things we need to know and It is examined on our flight test. Before flight test there is session called ground work where student pilots will be asked to recall what they studied in the subjects that is related to flight test. If you can not answer many examineer thinks you are not competent you will fail the exam straight away withouth even flying the a/c. Although we pass exam we need to keep up to date with our knowledge/ skills regularly. You can pass theory but when you are asked to recall( on ground work of flight test) you must be able to recall it. I know people who have failed flight test as they fail to show competency on ground work. So public out there pilots are trained really well. I am sure employeer will not be asking for our KDR and how many we got wrong. I might have got 100% on some test. It doesn't mean I am necessarily competent. Although it could be a yard stick to measure competency.
Another statement by Yu. "If you want to be saving lives behind your seat, you should know absolutly everything"
Well you are certainly right knowing everything is great. I am not sure weather you are managment student, ATC, or student pilot. Any way it is almost impossible to know everything about aircraft's system, meteorology, Human factor, Law, Priciple of flight to name a few topic pilot needs to study. The way exam is designed checks your overall understanding of the subjects.
Yu said" Meeting standards, i.e CPL flight test, does not mean you will survive a forced landing without power". Your statment is true. You do have to show examineer that you can do force landing without power and make the field you have choosen and show that you can carry out correct procedure and land. Examiner will be able to tell from their experience weather we can make field and land in the filed we have choosen. This also assures that we can most likely to survive . I have hardly heard force landing without power that has gone bad/ wrong. Infact I know successful landing has been made in southern raining area after engine failure.
For people who do not know STA . South of PM i.e Tokomaru, Shanon, Levin and area around those where different training organisaton go there for training purpose.
Above are just a thought as a student pilot point of view. Happy learning from wikidot. :):):)
Hi there:
Can not agree more with your comment, and thanks for explaining things in great detail. The reason I wrote the reply for that particular post was because the original topic was targeting an Air Traffic Controller that according to the writer, could not meet the standard and some how ended up on line in real life to make potential mistakes.
My intention was to defend the controller, mainly to point out we all make mistakes, and it is acceptable to a degree. From my understanding, Airways has strict procedures to deal with under-performing employees, and as been explained, the company wants him to pass. The check or exam in a "on job training"is more like a competency assessment, especailly in the ATC environment, the trainer and trainee have very close working relationship, therefore it is natural and understood that the trainer will do all he/she could, to help the trainee. Based on the day to day performance, he has already "passed", i.e. competent to take on that job.
My post was may be not clear, such as to know absolutly everything. The point being is if we can not, and no one can know absolutly everything, why this controller is getting a hard time in the original post. Im sure the ATC unit would have comprehensive systems like KDRs, shift reports. etc.
Thanks again for your infor, really appreciated.
Thanks for the comments, this will spark lively debate which I have to say is rather healthy. Your point about sitting an exam and only getting 70% is in my opinion not overly strong. All professions have a pass mark. It is deemed that once you have attained that mark, you are competent as deemed by the governing authority. The fact that you have failed to realise the remaining 30% is neither here nor there. My point earlier is that the ATC controller had caused several incidents (including A1's) in recent times. ATC management called this controllers situational awareness into question and rightly so. When we sit an exam or flight test, we are not afforded the opportunity to practice the exam first. Sure, we may practice previous exams or similar manoeuvres in order to maximise our chances of passing, but under no circumstances are we able or permitted to see the real exam and practice it. This is definitely cheating and should be treated as such.
I agree with you that organisations are reluctant to sack controllers and staff once considerable investment is made in their training. That is a separate issue. My point is that this controller and trainer were completely dishonest in their approach. A candidate must never be allowed to see an exam prior to sitting it. That is blatant cheating and is completely contrary to safety promotion. The organisation has failed in its attempt to rectify a poor performer because the controller has effectively learned nothing.
Both controller and trainer should be investigated for dishonesty. If it is proven then they should be sacked. Aviation has no place for the attitude "she'll be right mate". Controllers should only be there if they are able to perform to an acceptably safe standard. Can you imagine if air crew were able to do this? Think of the consequences.
In the case of the trainer and controller, the organisation has three options. Either invest more time into the controller with another trainer, or redeploy them into another area (not ATC) or sack them.
I have little sympathy for cheats especially when they are putting innocent lives at risk.
Thanks again for your thoughts!
All the comments above are valid to a degree and I agree that this industry is not one in which we can allow standards to slip or people within the system to subvert the established rules and methodologies.
I would however like to point out that, as in most things in our civilization, one person can really never be blamed entirely for their actions or for occurrences that happen "on their watch". When anyone does anything in our society, it is a result of the world around them allowing it to happen (or to have gotten to that point). When someone does something that the system doesn't approve of, it is easy to say "they are just bad people","he was insufficiently educated" or "he made a mistake" but the route cause of all those transgressions against the system are the sum of the systems worth. If we train and educate sufficiently, we can mitigate the factors that cause the issues, not just mitigate the issues. A shining example is detailed in this very instance. If, as recommended in the above post, we were to take option three to "sack" the controller, how has that removed the flaws in the system? Soon we will have to sack another controller as things are obviously set up to allow poor controllers to prevail.
If something happens that we do not believe is safe, it is simply not as easy as the anonymous poster stated above:
In the case of the trainer and controller, the organization has three options. Either invest more time into the controller with another trainer, or redeploy them into another area (not ATC) or sack them. (my bold highlighting)
These three options are NOT all we have and none of them actually solve the route issue.
Yes, all three take the controller away from his current role and thus performance and mitigate him causing a crash in the next little while, but the major issue here goes much deeper than you have suggested.
I believe the route issues here are four fold and industry wide:
Once senior personnel answer these questions more thoroughly, the relatively minor issues of "one ATCo's performance" and "the ethical integrity of the trainee and testing staff" will disappear as the measures and cultural ethos of the system will mitigate their presence prior to them becoming issues.
I know these are all very long range, sweeping questions, but as an industry we must look to the long term issues as well so we can solve the future "today's problems".
Ian McCulloch
イアン マカ-ロック
Professional Courtesy
Summary of Events
AK1, taxiing along the parallel taxiway, was told to give way to AK2 which was taxiing out from the apron taxiway as AK2 had a clearance expiry (it means the traffic needs to depart before the time is up otherwise, will have to hold and coordinate for a new slot). Judging from the distance between the 2 traffic, either one of them can be number 1. So, since AK2 had a restriction and AK1 had no restriction, ATC had made a decision to let AK2 go ahead of AK1.
AK1 was not very pleased with ATC’s decision and commented that he does not understand why he had to give way. ATC reiterated the rationale to him but AK 1 was still not satisfied with the explanation.
As both aircraft were of the same aircraft type, carrying almost the same number of passengers, ATC assumed that their performance would be similar. As such, ATC confidently climbed AK1 to a level, based on his projection; AK2 would have passed the level by then. However, moments later, ATC observed that the speed and climb rate of AK1 seemed too fast and catching up with AK2. ATC had no choice but to turn away AK1 to avoid any close call. From the way AK1 was flying, it appeared that AK1 was chasing and trying to catch up or overtake AK2.
Lesson learnt
1. Assumption
a. AK1 could have assumed that ATC gave preferential treatment to AK2 that lead to his dissatisfactions. Pilot should not have any misconception that ATC favours certain airlines. ATC have the full picture of all in and outgoing traffic. The goal of ATC is to analyse and plan to ensure minimum or no delay to all traffic with safety in mind. ATC cannot afford to show any preference to any airlines as that will increase the workload as well as complexity of the situation and ultimately lead to a situation beyond control such as RT and aerodrome congestion.
b. ATC should not have also assumed that the performance of the 2 traffic is the same. It may be of the same type, but operated by different pilots and different airlines, they can be different. Unless, both the traffic are ascertained to be positively on a diverging track, however in this case since it was not, ATC should have step climb the traffic following behind and not climb unrestricted.
2. Professionalism
AK1 had displayed poor airmanship. AK1 had no regards for ATC’s judgement and had taken things into his own hands that almost caused an incident due to their immature behaviour. Such behaviour cause undue stress to ATC and this is not acceptable. In the cockpit, there is a radar display. I believe pilots are able to tell if there are traffic close by, thus by him executing his action was clearly a violation of every ethical training as a pilot.
3. Feedback
From my knowledge, this occurrence was not feedback to the authorities. I believe it should have been reported to the management so that remedial actions can be taken upon the pilots. Perhaps the pilots need to be counselled by their company. This may be a one off occurrence, it may also have happened before. The pilots in question may have some problems that need to be addressed. As such, the company can actually start monitoring his behavioural pattern; determine if he is fit to pilot and the course of actions to be taken.
N.B. To prevent any conflict of interests, the actual names of the airlines have been substituted for purposes of confidentially.
Arrival Controller: “AK3, break-off approach now. I say again, break-off approach now, climb to ….”
This occurrence was related to me by my colleague and this was what happened ……
The designated runway for all landings is 17L. In this situation, AK3 was re-assigned to land on runway 17R at about 60nm out and pilot acknowledged the change in runway and read-back correctly.
Due to weather, AK3 had requested to descend to 1500 feet and a short approach to intercept the localiser at waypoint Ubun (about 4.5 nm finals, runway 17L). Arrival Controller informed the Tower that AK3 will be for a short approach for runway 17R. AK3 was given descent to 1500 feet and radar vectors were provided for a short approach for runway 17R.
When AK3 crossed localizer path for runway 17R, the Arrival Controller immediately instructed AK3 to turn right for runway 17R and the pilot acknowledged the clearance with ‘roger’.
Moments later, the Arrival Controller noticed that AK3 did not execute the turn to the right as instructed but was established on short finals runway 17L. As time was critical, coordination with the tower could not be effected, the arrival controller made a quick assessment of the vicinity to ensure that there were no other conflicting traffic, immediately instructed AK3 to break-off the approach.
Conclusion and Lesson Learnt
1. Coordination
It was a good practice that there was a prior coordination effected for a short approach when the pilot requested. This prepares the tower to expect the traffic to contact them only on short finals.
When there is a change in the landing runway, it is also a usual practice for the arrival controller to coordinate and get the concurrence from the tower before re-assigning it to the flight.
In this occurrence, to the arrival controller, AK3 was established on the wrong runway and as AK3 was on short finals, it was too late to effect any coordination with tower. Since the required coordination could not be effected, it was a good decision made to instruct AK3 to break-off approach on runway 17L as any uncoordinated actions may pose a threat to the safety of any flight and it is undesirable.
2. Read-backs and Hear-backs / Mind Set / Perception
In this occurrence, both the pilots and controllers have failed to listen diligently. Perhaps, the pilots’ attention were diverted as they were too engrossed in getting round the weather that they did not realise the series of instructions issued by ATC were in conflict with what they had in mind or planned. Controller, on the other hand, in trying to be helpful, had also failed to detect the discrepancies along the way.
2.1 The pilot perhaps did not click that he had acknowledged and read-back the changed in runway to 17R at 60nm out.
2.2 The Arrival Controller had failed to detect and query AK3 when they requested to track to Ubun, a waypoint approximately 4.5 nm finals, runway 17L.
2.3 The pilot had failed to realise that when instruction to track to Ubun was issued, the controller had mentioned runway 17R. It was a conflicting instruction as Ubun was a waypoint on runway 17L and not runway 17R. Perhaps, the pilots were anticipating and waiting for the controller’s instruction to execute the turn to intercept the localiser and selectively listened to what he wanted only.
2.4 The Arrival controller did not realise if AK3 had read-back the instruction correctly. He already had in mind what he expected to hear and therefore did not pay careful attention to the pilot’s read-back, resulting in the error and the subsequent corrective actions.
3. Professionalism
As a highly skilled arrival controller, he should not have provided radar vectors for an ILS approach to an aircraft for a 4 nm finals. He should be very conversant that any aircraft on an ILS approach would require 2 nm of level flight. By vectoring an aircraft for a 4 nm short finals may contribute to an unstable approach for the flight. In my opinion, if an aircraft request for a 1500 feet short approach to avoid weather, it would be beneficial to counter propose a visual approach. This would allow the pilot “free-play” to circumnavigate the weather and it will be safer as the pilots would know what to do – the correct speed, the terrain around and the right altitude they should be at.
From this occurrence, I would say that the break-off approach for AK3 was the result of a series of undetected errors by both the pilots and ATC. The main source of error was in the human-human interfaces. Both parties had their mind set and assumed that each being professional will do no wrong. There is a saying “it is only human to err” and one of the principles of Human Error is “Everyone makes mistakes”.
Controllers and pilots must be aware and always bear in mind that those Read-backs and Hear-backs are of paramount importance to ensure a safe flight. Do not have a mind set, do not assume, and do not get distracted. We must always listen attentively.
According to ICAO Annex 10 Volume II:
Read-back is defined as a procedure whereby the receiving station repeats a received message or an appropriate part thereof back to the transmitting station so as to obtain confirmation of correct reception.
An uncorrected erroneous read-back (known as hear-back error) may lead to a deviation from the intended clearance and may not be detected until the controller observes the deviation.
The following is an account of a recent situation I was involved in during a particularly busy period in a control zone.
I was the instructor in a light aircraft that was operating in the circuit which is at 1100ft above mean sea level (AMSL). The shape of the control zone's airspace is such that the northern boundary is very close to the northern circuit pattern, about two circuit widths from the runway centeline (approx 2 nautical miles in total). This being the case there is very little space between the edge of the circuit and the end of controlled airpace with an uncontrolled aerodrome with its own busy circuit about 4 nautical miles from the main airport. Due to the close proximity aircraft who want to enter the control zone have to wait until almost at the boundary to ensure that they are clear from any circuit traffic from the uncontrolled aerodrome, thus giving very little time to get a clearance to enter the zone.
During one particular climb out into the circuit on the crosswind leg I heard an aircraft call for joining, "X Tower, XXX94, 2 north of the field request joining for circuits with 2 POB Deltal 1013". The initial call was incorrect as an aircraft is supposed to call the tower and wait for their response before making a request, this is so the controller can decide if there is time to respond or talk to another more important aircraft etc. However this is not common practice at the aerodrome where XXX94 was from and they were in the mindset that this is the standard procedure. Needless to say the controller responded with "XXX94, Initial Contact". Which was basically a dig at the pilot who should have initiated contact by saying, "X Tower, XXX84" and waited for a response to proceed with the request. After about 20 seconds the controller called the aircraft again after giving instructions to other aircraft, "XXX94, X Tower. Remain outside controlled airspace, will call you again in 2 minutes". This was due to the large amount of circuit and other traffic in the vicinity.
As these calls were being said I was in the crosswind turning onto the downwind leg, which flys parallel but on a reciprocal heading to the runway being used for takeoff and landing. The next call which followed very shortly after the previous one was, "XXX94 report sighting (type) aircraft on mid-downwind", which was me. Before the pilot could respond the tower said to my aircraft, "XXX434 Essential Traffic is (type) aircraft busting airspace from the north overhead (reporting point), 1300ft, your 11 o'clock, 1 mile". The term 'essential traffic' is only ever used by ATC when there is the potential for a traffic conflict. At the same time my TCAS alerted me to the same aircraft and I started a right turn to veer away from the aircraft as it made a tight turn to vacate the aispace.
On reflection the situation was very well managed by both equipment in my aircraft (TCAS) and the tower controller using his radar display and perception of traffic conflict looking out the window. In the end the pilot had got too close expecting a clearance into the zone and didnt allow enough time to turn away if clearance was withheld, as it was in this case. There are a number of human factors lessons in this story such as getting into the mindset of expecting something to be the same as what you are used to, as well as having the situational awareness of what was going on with other aircraft such as me listening to the other aircraft's radio call. The ATC human factors involved using all the availiable resourses (Controller Resource Management) to detect, and mitigate, and solve the potential problem. Also by using the correct radio phraesology such as "essential traffic" made the information more important and easier to manage.
A chat with the tower controller on at the time afterwards was also very good to see how the situation developed from his perspective.
SKB981A =)
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