A private pilot operating in busy airspace elected to follow a GA pilot landing on a runway with an approximate 12 knot tailwind, and collided with lights at the start of the runway. This tore a large hole in the wing of the aircraft, but he managed to control the aircraft and taxy in to park. The damage was quite significant to the aircraft and he and his passengers had a lucky escape from what could have been a serious accident. The private pilot was obviously quite shaken by the incident and blamed the GA pilot for it. Upon discussion with the private pilot it was noted that:
1. he had not landed on this airfield for some time
2. he was an older gentleman who undoubtedly had much flying experience
3. he failed to check the direction of the wind, and its strength from the available windsocks, or if in doubt he could have checked on the local channel with the GA pilot what runway was in use (uncontrolled airspace) - but instead he assumed that because the GA pilot was landing on that particular runway, that that must be the runway in use
4. the GA pilot knew the capability of the aircraft he was flying, and elected the tailwind for expediency and perhaps the building of skills in this area
Lessons perhaps and hopefully learned by the private pilot:
1. don't assume anything - always double check
2. make sure you do it right - not only his life was at risk, but those of his passengers who were very shaken
3. a simple phone call to those at the airfield could have given him advance warning of the conditions at the field
4. take responsibility for your own flying and situational awareness
5. to reiterate point 1. don't assume anything!
Luckily no one was hurt and the aircraft though it sat for a very long time before it could be fixed, was fixed and flew again.
On a particularly nasty weather day below VFR conditions and not even operational IFR, information passed to that effect to GA operations who put all flights to airfield on hold. Incredibly an aircraft landed shortly thereafter at the airfield. On discussion with the pilot, who was carrying a fare paying passenger (though from my understanding not licensed to), indicated that "he shouldn't have come". Imagine my further surprise when he elected to take off in the same conditions and return to his airfield of origin. Points noted.
1. on his own admission he said that half way through his journey he got down to 500ft and still continued
2. at approximately 12 miles out he descended to 200ft and still continued
3. he said "he shouldn't have come out", though he still did, when he could have turned back
4. the passenger seemed a bit perturbed, but was probably completely unaware of the unsafe situation the pilot was operating in
5. this unnecessary flight put pilot and passenger at risk and could have turned out to be a disaster
CAA were notified.
Again, a simple call to the airfield could have been made and a stupid decision to fly averted. The weather is the weather, and the hills are pretty unforgiving.
[In behalf of tcl01, originally posted on 14 January 2009.]
Another day in the life of a busy GA pilot who was about to complete his third rotation of the day. He had flown in, unloaded passengers and freight on what was another very hot and busy day. He had re-loaded his plane, and boarded his passengers and was about to start his engines when he looked to the left (hands on the start buttons) and saw a person shutting the door directly in front of the propeller! He immediately took his hands off the start mechanisms and got out of the plane to go check the door… By this time the person had scarpered through the gates and was busy trying to make a quick getaway. When ops staff caught up with him to discuss his inappropriate and dangerous behaviour - he just said, oh for goodness sakes, I know how to shut a door, I am a pilot. (a retired pilot - even so, he should have known better than to do what he did).
1. Luckily the pilot checked left and right before starting the engine
2. If he had not done so which I guess he might easily have missed seeing as it was hot, it was busy, he still had another 2 rotations to do, the person could have been decapitated - in front of his family, who he had opened the door to talk to, and probably to the utmost horror of staff who witnessed the event and not least of all to the pilot
3. People can do strange things around aircraft and vigilance is always necessary
4. Check left and right before starting ! this saved that man's life
[In behalf of tcl01, originally posted on 14 January 2009.]
But that's not all…..
yet another busy day in GA. Yet another plane, another pilot, boarded ready to go - hands reaching for the start, when a person vaults the fence and runs at aircraft with arms waving to try attract attention of pilot - staff in hot pursuit with voices raised - luckily pilot spots this person and takes hands off start. Incredibly this person was also a pilot (private pilot), and also should have known better.
[In behalf of tcl01, originally posted on 14 January 2009.]
Still, there's more:
at this particular field, the Westpac Rescue helicopter visits on a fairly regular basis to ferry patients to hospital in emergency situations. It has its own parking area. One particular day, it is parked, still running, for a quick turnaround when some people from a private plane approach its tail rotors on their way to exit the field - this was a close call, which saw Westpac doubling its parking area to force private planes further away from its operational area.
[In behalf of tcl01, originally posted on 14 January 2009.]
Another instance, same problem. Two GA aircraft boarded and ready to start. In the background there is the hustle and bustle associated with two private planes who have landed, untold people milling around them, unloading and not paying any attention to the fact two aircraft are about to start and depart. Pilots are about to start their engines, when incredibly 3 people just walk right towards them and are only a matter of feet away from about to be fully operational aircraft. Pilots stop what they are doing and wait for these 3 to saunter to the gates, full of apology for walking through our busy operational space. They could have gone around the back of the aircraft by the fenceline and exited the field through a side gate. Or they could have waited with all their passengers at their aircraft for 2 minutes whilst the GA planes departed. Instead they chose to ignore what was going on, and walk straight into a potentially dangerous situation.
The lessons learned in all these situations
1. extreme vigilance when taxying in, and when about to start engines to taxy out
2. to watch out for people who will potentially approach an aircraft
3. to brief the people associated with the private flights of our movements and to direct them and their passengers to use the side exit
4. ops staff need to watch for people who look like they will make a move on an aircraft
5. to be aware that quite often people disregard or ignore, or are perhaps unaware of the extreme danger they place themselves in when they are around aircraft.
6. look left and right before starting engine/s to make sure no one is in your space
7. these incidents clearly demonstrate just how easy it would be for a nasty accident to occur
8. never assume anything when people are nearby to your aircraft
9. vigilance at all times!
Mid-air collisions can occur at any stage of a flight but the likelihood of such an occurrence according to Oster, Strong & Zorn (1992) is increased at lower altitudes where both VFR and IFR traffic share airspace, and where it is up to the pilot to avoid such collisions.
This incident happened a couple of years ago, and was followed up appropriately with CAA.
1. NEAR MISS
Auckland Tower cleared pilot from AA to Ardmore via Weymouth and was advised of a helicopter operating Papakura at 800ft. Pilot’s first call was “Weymouth tracking to Karaka 1000ft to join downwind runway 21, looking for helicopter”. At Karaka, with no visual of the helicopter, tracks towards Drury to stay well clear of traffic. Called at Drury to join downwind 21, and when abeam Papakura heard helicopter call “Papakura tracking to Hunua” – at this point should have been well clear. Tracked downwind for 21 and at Red Hill helicopter appeared at 1 oclock low, heading west. GA pilot entered steep climbing left turn to avoid collision and continued on to land at Ardmore.
GA pilot departs rural airfield, uncontrolled airspace en-route to AA at 1304 hours. Standard radio calls are made over the local channel at designated points advising position and track. When 15 nautical miles NE of waypoint, pilot heard a brief radio call announcing “XX operating in the area”. When 5 NM NE of waypoint, the aircraft was sighted in 10 o’clock position at estimated 800 metres distance, at same altitude, on a collision course. Both turned right to avoid each other, and pilot re-reported position and altitude, but received no reply.
Another standard GA departure and track to destination. At 1525 pilot hears transmission from “XX” 10 NM west of certain area tracking east. At 1535 pilot was overtaken on left side by XX at same level. Pilot watches as the XX apparently not noticing him then commences a right hand turn. Pilot instantly recognises situation developing and reduces power, turns left and makes descent. Passes XX at a distance of 800m abeam. Position reports made on both adjacent local frequencies with no response.
A brief explanation on some of these near misses. They relate to Military and Police aircraft, and we have learnt that because they fly complex and unusal patterns to carry out their missions, ATC find it difficult to maintain their separation with other aircraft (Miyagi, 2005). The nature of their work can mean that their workload is high, and for these reasons it is imperative we take special care when we know they are in the area. As we operate in uncontrolled airspace a good proportion of each flight, each pilot knows it is their responsibility to maintain separation from other aircraft in the vicinity. Creating accurate mental models for situational awareness is critical to safe operation (Oster et al, 1992), and when unsure, to check, double-check, and seek clarification when necessary and to be vigilant at all times, and avoid complacency as Jordan mentions in his lesson entitled THE DIRTY DOZEN. Jordan also brings up other vital ingredients which are important to safe operations - we really relate to this = teamwork (our pilots talk to each other, sound each other out, ask for opinions, clarify operating procedure, - the newer pilots learn from the ones who have been flying in these conditions for a while, and have useful tips and 'what to do's and what not to do's'. When in doubt, go SAFETY all the way.
GA pilot departed Taupo at 1737. ATC advised of traffic in the area due at 1749 carrying out a GPS approach via Gumen. GA pilot commenced a left visual departure and climbed to 5000ft and contacted control which advised of traffic approaching Gumen and requested GA pilot to broadcast on local, which pilot did. Pilot attempts to contact aircraft whilst control continued to speak. The controller was speaking very fast and the reception was poor. GA pilot understanding was that other aircraft was descending to 4000ft, so maintained 5000ft. This was not the case and shortly thereafter passed by each other. On later discussions between pilots, the captain of the commercial aircraft advised he had the GA aircraft on TCAS and separation was never broken.
GA pilot joining from non-traffic side to land as another aircraft lined up on runway. Aircraft still on runway as pilot approaches finals. At 500ft pilot realises that there is a banner on the ground by the aircraft, and a person walking along edge of seal. At 300ft pilot elects to go around as the other aircraft starts to roll. Go around completed normally. No radio calls were heard from the other aircraft. The only radio call heard was when they were rolling. No advice was received from them when pilot in the circuit as to what they were doing.
During vectors for the ILS approach at 23L at Auckland, radio comms with Auckland Control were temporarily disrupted. After establishing comms with AA control 129.6, pilot was given radar heading to fly 080 degrees. Short time later on this heading pilot notices that radio chatter has decreased and checked radio settings to find radio set to 129.7. Both first officer and captain unsure how this occurred and re-established comms with control who had been attempting to contact them. Approach completed uneventfully.
Pilot made standard radio calls to join for runway in use. Whilst crossing the fence sees a helicopter taking off on cross runway. Pilot calls short-finals and continues to land. On questioning the helicopter pilot who apologised, he said he never saw the in-coming aircraft. No radio calls had been heard by GA pilot from helicopter.
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