the lesson I learnt here is to always to have a back up plan(like we had our cell phones on just incase) and always do ur checks

I also encountered a similar situation. After finishing my runups during a Pre PPL solo flight, I checked to see if the door was closed. The latch was closed but the door had not fully closed. After takeoff at when i reached around around 80 knots I heard a loud noise of wind entering the cabin, and a cold breeze insind the cockpit. I immediately looked over at the door and saw it was open. I immediately requested to do a circuit and land the aircraft.

after I landed, I shut the door and made sure it was shut and locked and then took off and continued with my sortie.

So agreeing with what was said above, make sure that the door is actually secured and locked and to not panic. The door will remain closed over in flight thanks to the airflow, so a recircuit to land would be the appropriate thing to do.

Incident overview:
It was meant to be a normal flying sortie where I had to practice a few circuits in order to build up to my PPL flight exam. It was mainly a fine day with few clouds and light winds. There were 2 more aircraft in the circuit pattern along with me.

I was in the mid down-wind position when I made an attempt to make a radio call to the tower to let them know my position and intentions, but this is when things started to go wrong. My first attempt to initiate contact was unsuccessful. I was unable to hear a reply or any other aircraft over the radio. The radio was dead silent and all I could hear was the engine noise. I started to panic because I was approaching end of down-wing leg and I had to turn base leg before making the circuit very wide. I did some troubleshooting, eg: turning the volume up, making sure I am on the right frequency and even using comms 2 but all attempts failed. In the end I managed to use the in-built cockpit loudspeaker and made another call advising tower of my situation. I was given priority to land, soon after which I did and vacated the runway.

I was still very nervous and confused as to what might have caused this problem. While completing the after-landing checklist I noticed that my headphone jack was loose and was sticking out 1cm from the port!

Lesson learnt:
- It is vital to remain calm in all situations regardless of how bad the problem is.
- While troubleshooting, look for things that are less likely to go wrong before getting too technical.
- Amount of experience on type of aircraft and quality of aircraft system knowledge come in handy during situations like these
- Decision to continue in the circuit pattern and transmit blind was a show of good airmanship

Computers in the plane are referred to as autopilot. They relieve the pilot of workload, and help fly the plane, usually for the benefit of a smooth and comfortable flight. A recent experience using the autopilot system has been disappointing, but somewhat not surprising as errors are expected to occur.

On a climb after takeoff in a DA42 aircraft, pilots are taught to engage the KAP140 autopilot system and start monitoring instruments especially for flights under Instruments Flight Rules (IFR). What this autopilot system does is obey command inputs from the pilot and send an output signal to the flight control surfaces. In this particular flight, the barometric pressure and altitude has been set into the system. Climbing out from Palmerston North and heading towards the east over the ranges, a key factor of terrain poses a threat towards the flight.

My flight instructor and I were supposed to level off at 7000ft, when the autopilot levelled the plane at 6500ft- a difference of 500ft. While it may not sound like a big deal, but when there are terrain considerations in place, it can be potentially dangerous. Having not touched anything to the autopilot after the initial data input, we were struggling to understand what was wrong with the system. After troubleshooting the whole system, it was found out that the barometric pressure had skipped a beat, and was 20 hectopascals higher than the initial settings, hence telling the aircraft that it should be at a lower altitude.

The flight went on without any further incidents. However, on a different aircraft-but also a DA42, and at a different place in a different flight, the same thing happened to us. Clearly, the odds tell us that there definitely must be a glitch present in the system. This was reported to engineers on the ground after landing.

Lesson learnt is that though we trust computers a lot in today’s modern world, we must never take it for granted that it will always do what we want it to do. Especially in aviation where safety is a huge concern, we must check the instruments periodically to check the functionality and usability of the system. This case has shown that things at times do go wrong, and it’s only up to the pilot’s background knowledge and situational awareness that could turn a potentially serious situation into one that is not.

During an IFR air transport operation in PA23-250, light twin engine aircraft.

After take off, the passenger saw the "Door Jar" light was illuminated. At the time, the aircraft was in the take off climb configuration through 1,500 feet. As the pilot in command, I decided to delay the action until we gained a little more height. The climb out did appear to be normal, apart from the sensation of a leaking air in the cabin, and defintely felt a little cold. Once reaching cruise altitude of 9,000 feet, I decided to try to shut the door.
The aircraft was not equiped with auto pilot, and I was VMC above scatted cloud. The passenger was sitting beside me.
1st I tried to shut the door again, but the airflow was so strong, it did not work.
2nd I slowed the aircraft down and reduced power on the right engine, to slow the speed towards Vmca. I was comfortable with the
manuvour as to I am qualified multi-engine instructor and have demostrated this manuvor before. This did not work.
3rd As previous methods could not shut the door, with my limited experience I decided to do method 2 again, but this time instead of just
shutting it, I wanted to push it open and the use the momentum to shut it.
This went wrong, as I opened the door the aircraft violently pitched as the door sheilded the elevator airflow. Inside the cabin became suddenly very cold and loud.

I made the radio call, not with urgency nor emergency, as the aircaft was still flyable. But I was unable to maintain 9,000 feet due to the lost of aerodynamics. I drifted down, got below the cloud and visual. Through out the incident, as company procedure to contact ops asap, but could not be reached, so I asked the radar control to help me make the phone call as I gave him my plan of action, which was diverting to the nearest.
After liase with ops, I diverted to the nearest, before landing, I briefed the passenger to hold and try to close the door as much as possible during my final 200 feet, as to I do not know how much elevator effectiveness I have lost.
normal touch down was made.

The lesson learnt from this was, even though I made the right decision in regarding to the flight, and it was safe, but I should have not touched the door in flight. The correct action should have been visual circuit to land after seeing the light, inspected it and continue from there.

the day began without incident and my instructor and I had just finished a couple of circuits and were climbing into the training area. The country where I learnt to fly is so tiny that a "training area" a quarter the size of taupo had to be declared for ab-initio training. As we climbed to 3000ft, I noticed that although my instructor was talking to me, I was not able to hear his voice through my headset. Thinking it was very peculiar, I checked the headset jacks to see if they has come loose. Nothing seemed wrong with them, so I checked the radio stack. to my surprise, it was turned off! I also realised that my Artificial horizon was still, and the red flag on my turn co-ordinator was up! realising that the radios had failed and my vacuum system was down, I diagnosed it as a total electrical failure.

Bringing the events to the attention of my instructor, All he said was,"stay cool, now what?" indicating that he wanted me to trouble shoot the emergency. (I assume that since the engine was still running, we were not in any immediate danger, he was taking this as a real life emergency exercise and would assume control if things got out of hand)

Referring to the Flight Reference Cards, as well as from what I've learnt the previous lessons, I immediately carried out the appropriate steps to correct the problem. Fortunately the power was re-supplied and everything was back to normal. I told my instructor that it would be good practice to abort the sortie and continue another day. He said that it was a wise decision and I was instucted to return to the airfield.

Lesson: An aircraft is a tool that we use to get from point A to point B. It is not a foolproof superpower that enables men to fly; Aircraft will break down from time to time and it is in a pilot's responsibility to be able to troubleshoot the problem appropriately. Many symptoms may contribute to one problem source, but it must not be taken for granted, the source may produce further problems if it is not eliminated. Unfortunately. there is only so much a pilot can do from inside the cockpit to prolong the airworthiness of an aircraft. Should there be signs of a problem, even if the problem can be rectified, it is good practice to abort the flight and get the problem checked out from the inside. In the case above, the Electrical Failure was caused by a faulty Bus Bar. Therefore, should the flight have continued, the problems might have become worse.

One of the checks that my instructor kept on emphasising is the need to check the fuel pressure when turning the fuel pump off after take- off above 1000ft AGL. Still, each flight I verbalise the words “fuel pump off, fuel pressures remains” without really checking it properly. Until this small technical incident that happened to me in early 2007 when flying a light aircraft. This incident occurred on one of my solo navigational training flights for my private pilot licence:

It was a cloudy day with clouds broken around 3500ft and little wind when I conducted this navigational flight. I did a precise pre- flight, ensuring that the oil levels were adequate and sufficient fuel was present for the duration of the flight plus reserves. I started up the aircraft and did run- ups, everything was normal. On the ground roll for take- off and after take- off during climb out the temperatures and pressures were all indicating normally. I continued my climb and above 1000ft AGL I turned the fuel pump off. I started to verbalise “fuel pump off, fuel pressure… is zero!”. The fuel pressure dropped to zero! Panic struck me for a second and I immediately turned on the fuel pump back on. Luckily the fuel pressure was restored.

I continued my departure and once I am cleared of the controlled airspace, I contacted my flight school regarding this problem. I was told by the instructors that this problem sometimes happens during climb out in our light aircraft. However, I could return if I am not comfortable to continue. I decided to continue on my flight and left the fuel pump on for longer while monitoring the temperature and pressures. At the same time I formulated my alternate/ diversion plan. The temperature and pressures were all indicating normal, and after about 20 minutes I switched the fuel pump off and the fuel pressure settled in the green range. I successfully completed my flight.

This technical incident, although small taught me a great deal about the seriousness of actually “doing” the checks, not just scanning it as if nothing would go wrong. If I had not checked the fuel pressure that day, the result may be a force landing and putting myself in unnecessary danger. Carrying out the checks/procedures accurately and precisely is extremely important, even if it means more time is needed. We as pilots should always ‘expect’ that something may go wrong, and be ready and on the alert. Always seek help and assistance if unsure. Formulate a back- up/ diversion plan, and discontinue flight if in doubt. As they always say, “Aviation has no dress rehearsal”!

Ten minutes after takeoff on a Cessna 177 from Christchurch, I noticed that the engine oil temperature had increased and that oil pressure was registering at the bottom of the green range. I made an immediate landing at West Melton aerodrome.

It was later found that too much oil had been added during my pre flight check and that this had cased inefficient oil cooling, which led to the high oil temperature and low pressure.

Two litres of oil were drained from the engine by the maintenance. Operations have since been normal.

During the pre-flight check of a Cessna 172. I noticed that the righthand outboard aileron hinge pin was missing. I immediately reported to my instructor. He made a temporary repair and we (my instructor was PIC) flew the aircraft to its maintenance base.

My instructor was not authorised to carry out the repair work prior to the flight, he was not supervised by a licensed engineer, and unapproved and non-standard parts were used to complete the temporary repair. This effectively rendered the aircraft airworthiness certificate invalid for the flight.

I had the unfortunate experience of being the pilot-in-command of Cherokee 6. It has a Lycoming O-54 engine. This particular engine has a push-in oil dipstick instead of the screw-in type.

When replacing the dipstick, I thought I have aligned the dipstick with a small diameter hole in the top of the sump (as required). And I gentle pushed to click it into place.

On that day of the incident, the oil was topped up, the dipstick replaced and lock-in position. The first indication of anything being wrong was during the run-up, when the top of half of the dipstick flew out from under the cowl. I shut down the engine rapidly to prevent further damage.

I was unaware of this could happen and have spoken to pilots and maintenance personnel. They had also not heard of this anomaly.

A dead magneto during the post-start magneto check on Cessna 172. It was happened in 2002. I reported to the maintenance engineer on duty.

Further talk to the maintenance, they revealed that magneto had detached from its mounting and that the mounting flanges had broken. When they removed and striped the magneto, they discovered that one of the impulse coupling weights ahs seized on its pivot shaft, which had then fretted over time, casing the weight to become loose and contact the magneto housing. This could have caused further damage to the drive train of the right magneto.

This incidence happened in 2002. I took off from grass runway 20 for a check flight under the supervision of a flying instructor on a Cessna 172. The surface wind was 190/15kts.

While turning right at about 450 feet agl, the engine began to run roughly. My instructor took control, and climbing slowly, turned to position downwind for an immediate landing on Runway 20. He made a Pan call and switched off each magneto in turn and selected carb heat, without effect. The instructor positioned so glide landing was possible. He selected full flap on final and landed slightly long. The aircraft came to rest with sufficient runway remaining.

After the maintenance check, one spark plug in the left magneto was breaking down and another in the right bank had a cracked ceramic insulator. Both were replaced and the engine performed normally.

Things to learn:
1. Cheked the door not only visually but confirmed them it is secure and locked.
2. Quick decision for immediate action, don't panic, keep calm so we can think..
3. And report any defect to operation, therefore further maintenence can be done.

From that, I learnt that every checked that we do in the aircraft is very important. If you are not sure what happened confirm the situation to one of the person who knows best such as engineer. So don't miss the checked and ask for help.

Cheers

It was still 30 minutes till my flight so there was no rush to preflight. After the student got off, i took the green card to check for any deffered abnormalities or any other technical issues. All was good and the green card was blank. As I checked the Engine compartment, i pulled the dipstick and checked the oil level. It was a tad low, maybe 5.6quartz (massey requires 6 quartz).
And when i did a visual look around the engine compartment, i realised there was engine oil sprayed all over the firewall. Was that normal? i thought to myself.

Decided to grab an instructor and he came out and inspected the spray. He told me it was pretty bad. and i definitely should not have flown. I was OK with it as i got another plane which i did fly with. What i was more concerned was the fact that the student who just came back from the flight had been flying with a leaking engine, did he manage to spot the leak before he left? or did it occur during his flight? Never got the answers but im sure the student has been informed.

This incident struck me as to how complacent we can get, feeling almost invulnerable sometimes because to some of us flying VFR can be like driving a car, but when the car's engine fails, it isn't as troublesome as a plane engine failing.

- Rnadom.

This occured on a solo navigation exercise with a fellow student from PM-MS (dropping off parts in MS) then planned to fly up to NR and home. We landed in MS and dropped of a carburettor to an instructor then carried on our way, we set heading for NR and after about 20 mins my passenger noticed fluid leaking onto his shoes. The fluid was coming from the rudder pedal and I immediately adjusted heading back to PM, the day was fine and we could see the gorge from our position. Approaching the gorge from the south-east I contacted base and let them know what was happening, then contaced tower and told them. I was trying to land as short and slow as safely possible to try minimise landing roll incase the brakes were completely inoperative, upon touchdown I braked and braking action was about half as much as usual, I then taxiied in and the engineers came out to look.

This incident highlights the need for a thourough in cabin preflight inspection.

Funny how i was in a similar situation but i had the luxury of being in a controlled airspace. Was doing circuits at Palmerston North's Runway 25. Did about a couple of circuits and everything was fine. On the third circuit, something untoward happened. I called Tower to inform that i was downwind and requested for a touch and go. After almost 10 seconds, Tower did not reply. I transmitted the same radio call one more time. Once again, Tower did not respond. I checked that the jacks from my headset were plugged in properly and that the volume was audible. I feared for the worse. Unsure of what to do, i continued downwind. This time i transmitted blind and squaked 7600. From what we were trained to do, i continued with the circuit pattern and awaited the light signals from Tower. Thankfully there were only two traffic including myself. Tower gave me the "Steady Green" to land. Managed to land the aircraft safely without any episodes.

I was truly impressed with how quickly Tower recognised the position i was in and how quickly they helped me.
An incident report was done.

[In behalf of SBK981A, originally posted on 22 Oct 2008]

While doing a sortie with my instructor in the Northern Training area, my instructor and I were practicing forced landing in the Pohangina Valley. We were in one of the older leased aircraft that had just joined the fleet. Everything was fine until about 30 mins into the flight when after conducting HASELL checks before stalling practice, I noticed that the ammeter was reading 60 amps (the max on the gauge). I alerted my instructor who instructed me to try alternating between the alternator and battery on/off positions. The ammeter then flicked back to 0, and a few seconds later we started to smell an electical burning smell… We immediatley switched off all electrics and waited for the smell to subside. Once it had we turned the battery on and started heading for palmy, but realised soon enough that the comms were not working, even though the intercomm was. Since we had no comms we headed for the nearest uncontrolled aerodrome which was Fielding, transmitting blind and setting 7600 on the transponder (even though it didnt appear to work either). We made a NORDO landing at Fielding and called Ops, who sent out engineers with a new battery and comm box. In the end the battery was at fault and after this was replaced we headed back to Palmy using the comms which are internally contanined within the GPS, but with no transponder.

In the end this was far from a major incident, but highlighted that we neglected to use the QRH (Quick Reference Handbook) when it should have been used. We did run through it but only after we had sorted a means of getting back to Fielding…goes to show that the QRH is there for a reason and it should be used even if it seems a silly idea.

SBK981A =)