The crash occurred at Kansas City, Missouri the 16 February 1995 (NTSB, 1995). The Air Transport International flight was scheduled to fly from Kansas City to Chicopee for engine maintenance (NSTB, 1995). With one inoperative engine of the Douglas DC-8 aircraft, the crews had aborted the initial takeoff attempt after losing control of the aircraft (Wiegmann, 2003). In the second attempt, the crews once again lost control of the aircraft (Wiegmann, 2003). However, the captain decided to continue and rotated the aircraft early rather than abort the takeoff as they had before (Wiegmann, 2003). Finally, the aircraft roll to the left and crashed into the ground (Wiegmann, 2003). Tragically, all three crews on board were killed (NTSB, 1995).
Wrong Decision Made
The captain made a wrong decision to continue the takeoff in the second takeoff attempt without sufficient considerations (NTSB, 1995). The loss of control of the aircraft in both the first and second attempts was because of the increase of the thrust too quickly, thus causing the left-drifting of the aircraft (Wiegmann, 2003). Repeating the same mistake shows the crews did not analyze the causes for the loss of control in the first takeoff attempt thoroughly (Wiegmann, 2003). Without the identification of the true cause, the captain decided to continue the uncontrolled takeoff in the second attempt instead of adopting the takeoff, leading to the accident (Wiegmann, 2003).
1. The decision-making process should be improved by outcome evaluation, error catching, as well as the increase of realistic training (Orasanu, 2009 and Wiegmann, 2003). To evaluate the outcome, crews should consider constraints on options thoroughly prior to acting (Orasanu, 2009).
2. Instead of relying on the captain only, error catching should be performed among all crews to monitor the performance of each other and solve the problems encountered together (Orasanu, 2009).
3. Realistic training should be increased using the flight simulators (Wiegmann, 2003). If crews had accumulated enough experience of three-engine takeoff from this type of training, they would have recognized the stimulus more quickly and made a more appropriate decision (Robson, 2008).